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ABSTRACT
Background Well- functioning patient feedback systems 
can contribute to improved quality of healthcare and 
systems accountability. We used realist evaluation to 
examine patient feedback systems at health facilities 
in Bangladesh, informed by theories of citizenship and 
principal–agent relationships.
Methods We collected and analysed data in two stages, 
using: document review; secondary analysis of data from 
publicly available web- portals; in- depth interviews with 
patients, health workers and managers; non- participant 
observations of feedback environments; and stakeholder 
workshops. Stage 1 focused on identifying and articulating 
the initial programme theory (PT) of patient feedback 
systems. In stage 2, we iteratively tested and refined 
this initial theory, through analysing data and grounding 
emerging findings within substantive theories and 
empirical literature, to arrive at a refined PT.
Results Multiple patient feedback systems operate in 
Bangladesh, essentially comprising stages of collection, 
analysis and actions on feedback. Key contextual enablers 
include political commitment to accountability, whereas 
key constraints include limited patient awareness of 
feedback channels, lack of guidelines and documented 
processes, local political dynamics and priorities, 
institutional hierarchies and accountability relationships. 
Findings highlight that relational trust may be important 
for many people to exercise citizenship and providing 
feedback, and that appropriate policy and regulatory 
frameworks with clear lines of accountability are critical 
for ensuring effective patient feedback management within 
frontline healthcare facilities.
Conclusion Theories of citizenship and principal–agent 
relationships can help understand how feedback systems 
work through spotlighting the citizenship identity and 
agency, shared or competing interests, and information 
asymmetries. We extend the understanding of these 
theories by highlighting how patients, health workers and 
managers act as both principals and agents, and how 
information asymmetry and possible agency loss can be 
addressed. We highlight the importance of awareness 
raising and non- threatening environment to provide 
feedback, adequate support to staff to document and 
analyse feedback and timely actions on the information.
Key questions
What is already known?
 ► Well- functioning patient feedback systems can con-
tribute to improved quality of healthcare and ulti-
mately make health systems more accountable and 
responsive to local needs.
 ► Most published evidence comes from high- income 
countries and hospital settings with less research 
from lower- income countries and frontline health fa-
cilities, and this study used realist evaluation to ex-
amine patient feedback systems at frontline health 
facilities in Bangladesh.
What are the new findings?
 ► Multiple patient feedback systems operate in 
Bangladesh in the context of political commitment 
to accountability and responsiveness, but are con-
strained by limited patient awareness of feedback 
channels, lack of guidelines and documented pro-
cesses, local political dynamics and priorities, insti-
tutional hierarchies and accountability relationships.
 ► Relational trust can be important for people to ex-
ercise their citizenship in providing feedback, and 
appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks with 
clear lines of accountability are critical for ensuring 
effective patient feedback management.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Theories of citizenship and principal–agent relation-
ships can help understand how feedback systems 
work through spotlighting the citizenship identity 
and agency, shared or competing interests, and in-
formation asymmetries.
 ► It is critical to ensure people’s awareness of their 
rights to provide feedback, and of available and 
easily accessible feedback channels, within a non- 
threatening environment in which people can freely 
express their views.
 ► Clear policies and operating guidelines with staff 
support and dedicated resources, will enable health 
workers to value, document and analyse information 
from patient feedback; and communicating timely 
actions taken helps maintaining people’s satisfac-
tion with, and trust in, their health systems.
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BACKGROUND
Effective interactions between patients and health 
systems are critical to well- performing systems.1–4 Well- 
functioning patient feedback systems help improve 
healthcare quality and ultimately accountability and 
responsiveness of national health systems.2 3 5–9
Effective feedback systems involve two key features. 
First is the supportive environment for patients to provide 
feedback on their experiences.1 5 10 Second is the health 
system’s ability to adequately respond to, and act on feed-
back.1 6 8 Substantial research covers patient feedback 
systems, their typologies, assessments and contributions 
to service quality improvement.1 6 9 11–15 However, most 
evidence comes from high- income countries and hospital 
settings, with less research covering lower- income coun-
tries and frontline health facilities.
We report a realist evaluation of patient feedback 
systems at local- level health facilities in Bangladesh. Our 
key question is: what about the patient feedback systems 
has worked, for whom, in which circumstances and why? 
Our findings should be of interest to academics and prac-
titioners interested in understanding and improving, 
patient feedback systems and wider health systems 
performance.
Theoretical underpinnings
Two theoretical perspectives underpin patient feedback 
systems. First, providing feedback is an act of citizenship 
involving social identity and practices by people with 
different capacities and resources within political and 
social structures and institutions.16–19 As Lister explains20 
(p41) ‘To be a citizen in the legal and sociological sense 
means to enjoy the rights of citizenship necessary for 
agency and social and political participation. To act as 
a citizen involves fulfilling the potential of that status’. 
Thus, citizenship is both an identity and a practice.16 17 21 
Understanding of identity shapes one’s exercise of citi-
zenship within social spaces (home, community, institu-
tions, national politics, the global arena). People have 
different capacities and resources to express their citizen-
ship identity within contexts of sociopolitical opportuni-
ties through available places and spaces.16 18 19 Expres-
sions of citizenship include political forms such as voting 
in elections16 21–23 and patient feedback systems provide 
platforms for people’s engagements in decision- making 
within health facilities.
Second, multiple relationships between healthcare 
providers, patients and managers, occur within contexts 
of entrenched bureaucratic and professional hierar-
chical roles and relational dynamics.24–27 The Principal–
Agent (PA) theory therefore helps understand these 
relationships. It postulates that all organisations require 
employer–employee cooperation.24 Using the metaphor 
of a contract, the PA theory highlights the agency in the 
relationship where the principal delegates work to the 
agents,25 26 for example, health managers delegating 
work to health workers, respectively. Central to this 
are the goal conflicts and differing preferences within 
hierarchical relationships. Two assumptions contribute 
to potential agency loss, a common metric for deter-
mining whether agents act in the principal’s interests26: 
diverging and independent interests of each party and an 
information asymmetry with agents being generally more 
knowledgeable of the local circumstances including their 
efforts and capacities. The PA theory seeks the most effi-
cient contract with assumptions about the individuals 
(eg, self- interest, bounded rationality, risk preferences), 
the organisations (eg, goal conflicts) and information 
(ie, acquired commodity leading to information). Patient 
feedback systems involve relationships between three 
groups (patients, healthcare providers and managers) 
within contexts of information asymmetry and poten-
tially diverging expectations.
Context
Bangladesh comprises 8 divisions, 64 districts, 481 subdis-
tricts (Upazilas) and 4403 unions. Most health budget 
is earmarked for Upazila Health Complexes (UHCs), 
making them a backbone of the country’s public health 
system. UHCs serve a population of 200 000–400 000, offer 
both inpatient (31–50 beds) and outpatient services, and 
act as first level referral for community clinics and village 
(union) health centres. UHC has between 93 and 128 
staff, including 9–20 doctors, 13–16 nurses, 2 pharmacists 
and 2–5 laboratory technicians.28 UHCs provide preven-
tive and basic curative services, have an ambulance and a 
pharmacy. A health management committee comprising 
local politicians, facility managers, civil society represent-
atives and local leaders, monitors UHC work.
Improving health system’s accountability to the popula-
tion is high on the policy agenda.29 An overarching frame-
work, known as a Citizens Charter, summarises patient 
rights within public health facilities such as the right 
to receive affordable healthcare and with appropriate 
dignity and respect. This Charter is typically displayed 
at the entrance to public health facilities (online supple-
mental file 1).
Multiple centrally and locally managed patient feed-
back systems operate at UHCs (table 1). Their common 
strength is the underlying political commitment to 
enabling citizens voice and accountability, whereas 
common weaknesses include unclear processes and 
limited promotion of available channels. Unlike the 
locally managed, the centrally managed systems tend to 
have more functional record- keeping.
METHODS
Given our interest in understanding ‘what about the 
patient feedback systems has worked, for whom, in 
which circumstances and why’, we chose to conduct a 
mixed- methods realist evaluation. A realist approach was 
deemed appropriate because it entails a theory informed 
critical examination of a programme’s logic within its 
context, articulated as a programme theory (PT).30 PTs 
represent hypotheses to be subsequently tested, refined 
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and consolidated. Researchers interrogate their initial 
PTs through identifying causal pathways of how specific 
mechanisms (reasoning and resources) are triggered in 
different contexts, to produce (un)intended outcomes. 
These pathways are articulated as Context- Mechanism- 
Outcome configurations31–33 (CMOs). The refined PT is 
based on the evaluation about what aspects of the inter-
vention worked, for whom, in which conditions and why. 
RAMESES II standards for reporting realist evaluations34 
guided this paper.
The study was conducted in two UHCs of Comilla 
district which neighbours the capital Dhaka, and has one 
of the highest feedback rates. This selection was based 
on: (a) analysis of publicly available web portal of patient 
feedback data and (b) non- participant observations of 
patient feedback environments.35
We collected data in two stages, using different methods 
(figure 1).
Stage 1 was exploratory and focused on identifying 
the initial PT, using the literature, perspectives of poli-
cymakers, facility managers and patients, to understand 
the logics behind patient feedback systems. We began 
with a review of design- related documents: practice 
guidelines, which articulated processes of the feedback 
system and the different roles involved; job descriptions 
of involved personnel; internal reports and news items 
about patient grievances. In total, 18 documents were 
reviewed; these were obtained from Directorate General 
of Health Services, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
(MoHFW) and through a web search.
We then conducted in- depth interviews (n=5) with a 
small number of purposefully selected public represen-
tative of the Upazila council, two national policymakers 
and two health facility managers, to understand their 
perspectives. All interviews were transcribed verbatim 
and uploaded into NVivo for coding by the contexts, 
mechanisms and outcomes. We conducted a stakeholder 
workshop to glean their understanding of how the feed-
back system was supposed to work, and elaborate specific 
CMOs. Throughout stage 1, we explored substantive 
theories which could help frame the logics underpinning 
patient feedback systems and the specific CMOs.
Non- participant observations informed the selection of 
study sites and were also conducted during stage 1. The 
rationale was to complement resource- intensive inter-
views, and gaps in feedback documentation (table 1). 
Observations lasted between 30 min and 2 hours and 
covered degree of visibility, user- friendliness, utilisation 
Table 1 Patient feedback systems in public health facilities in Bangladesh (data from informal stakeholder engagements)





 ► Anonymous, if registered get 
SMS updates.
 ► Instructions, contacts 
explained.
 ► Focal person from each 
ministry.
 ► Online breakdown of cases by 
ministries.
 ► A system not seemingly 
functional.
 ► Public awareness is 
limited.
 ► No monitoring with local 
level.







SMS→MOHFW verifies→call UHCs→priority 
assigned, solution→steps logged
 ► Texts anonymous.
 ► Instructions on boards at facility 
entrance.
 ► Verification of cases, local 
resolution.
 ► Online data available by type, 
time, facility.
 ► No promotion, other 
than boards at UHCs.
 ► Inaccessible to illiterate, 
with no mobiles.
 ► No guidelines or 
policies.




Over 15 daily Call→operator registers feedback, 
name, address→MIS→investigation, 
resolution→report back
 ► Patients can feedback 
anonymously.
 ► Toll- free number promoted by 
flyers and posters at health 
centres.
 ► Online breakdown by types 
and time.
 ► Promotion at the sub- 
district not evident.
 ► No systematic 
documentation.
 ► Feedback processing 





Contact staff→feedback→resolution  ► Verbal feedback to UHC head, 
emergency department, staff.
 ► Immediate response.
 ► No guidelines about 
lodging.
 ► No records kept.
Written letters Unrecorded 
reportedly very 
rare
Letter to management 
committee→investigation→resolution→report 
back
 ► UHFPO assigns focal person, 
monitors.
 ► Committee decisions published 
online.
 ► Unused, broken, boxes, 
no instructions.
 ► No written record kept.
 ► No assigned person for 
the feedback.
Complaint box Rarely used Written feedback→report the head of 
UHC→resolution, reporting
 ► Anonymity possible.
 ► Local resolution at UHC.
 ► Convertible to digital format by 
scanning.
 ► No assigned person 
available.
 ► Boxes often broken or 
closed.
MoHFW, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; UHC, Upazila Health Complex; UHFPO, Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer.
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and maintenance of key feedback channels in the UHCs 
such as suggestion boxes or telephone hotlines. A semi-
structured observation checklist (online supplemental 
file 2) UHCs was used.
In stage 2, we iteratively tested and refined initial PT 
and its detailed CMOs, and at the end of this stage we 
eventually consolidated the revised PT. At this stage, we 
used data from observations and in- depth interviews 
(n=20) with 10 health staff and 10 patients from UHCs. 
The initial PT provided the basis for the interview guide 
and for the checklist for observations. The interviews 
were also oriented towards interrogating the veracity of 
aspects of the initial PT. Each interview lasted 25–60 min, 
was audio- recorded and transcribed verbatim, trans-
lated into English where required and uploaded into 
NVivo where coding was now more driven by elements 
of causality within the CMOs. Two researchers conducted 
non- participant observations, using a checklist of pres-
ence of feedback materials and processes, and func-
tioning of the feedback system.
At this stage, we conducted two stakeholder workshops. 
These lasted 4–5 hours and each involved 20–25 repre-
sentatives from government (12–15), non- government 
(4–5) and international organisations (4–5). Workshops 
included presentations of emerging findings to inform 
a plenary discussion, and then more in- depth work in 
smaller groups to validate results. While the primary aim 
of these workshops was to share and validate emerging 
results with key stakeholders, proceedings were audio- 
recorded following informed consent and were treated 
as further data for analysis.
A retroductive approach to data analysis36 37 was used 
throughout the study. It combined both inductive and 
deductive logics to identify often hidden generative 
causation within our PTs. This included iterative engage-
ments with: (a) data from interviews, documents and 
observations, which were analysed by local researchers 
in Bangladesh who were trained in realist evaluation 
and then extensively discussed among the team; (b) 
the underpinning theoretical and relevant empirical 
literature which was continuously identified and reviewed 
and (c) engagements with key stakeholders throughout 
the study and during two workshops.
RESULTS
Our initial PT (figure 2) was gleaned from iterative docu-
ment review, stakeholder perspectives from initial inter-
views and literature.
Our initial PT comprised three CMOs, which reflected 
three steps in patient feedback management.15 As we 
elaborate next, during stage 2 of the study these CMOs 
were iteratively tested and validated against the data and 
the literature.
Collecting feedback
The interviews revealed that patients were generally 
aware of their rights to express opinions. This reflected 
the context of Bangladesh with vibrant grassroots- level 
citizenship. However, as our observations also revealed, 
many patients did not know about available feedback 
channels:
In this health complex … [laughing with a bit of incredu-
lity], I am not aware of … such a thing. To my knowledge, 
there isn’t any feedback system … [with confusion]’ (Pa-
tient: 005)
Most managers concurred and shared the view that 
while feedback systems existed at UHCs, patient aware-
ness of both their rights to and of available feedback 
channels, was limited. Service providers reflected that 
lack of awareness was due to a mix of low literacy and 
insufficient system’s efforts:
Basic reason for low awareness is poor education. Another 
reason is information gap … they do not know about the 
systems. (Provider: 003)
Many available feedback channels were not accessible. 
Observations revealed that the information about the 
SMS system was on a whiteboard on a wall, but at a not 
easily visible height (online supplemental file 1). While 
Figure 1 Study methods across the two stages. PT, programme theory; UHCs, Upazila Health Complexes.
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suggestion boxes existed at every UHC, most were not 
clearly labelled. Consequently, most remained either 
unused or even misinterpreted as donation boxes which 
tend to be ubiquitous in public locations in Bangladesh 
(online supplemental file 1). As a result, many felt what 
one patient said ‘The [SMS] board and the [suggestion] 
box failed to attract my attention. They are not eye- 
catchy’ (Patient, UHC).
Social access to feedback channels was often more 
important than physical. In Bangladesh, the socioeco-
nomically disadvantaged often perceive themselves as 
not deserving of raising voice against the unfairness they 
encounter, as illustrated in the following quotes.
A patient like me is not likely to discuss such issue … If I 
say something, they wouldn’t listen. It would prove helpful, 
but I do not think I can have the capacity … (Patient: 006)
People like you and me … we know that we can protest 
against anything wrong … However, those who come from 
villages … they simply accept the mistreatments in silence. 
They do not even know how to complain or whom to com-
plain to. If someone asks for a bribe, they simply bribe the 
person to get help. (Patient: 007)
In the second excerpt a socioeconomically well- off 
patient explains these class differences. This poverty of 
agency, and the lack of access among those at the bottom 
of the socioeconomic hierarchy is well recognised in 
Bangladesh. However, the multiple feedback channels 
do not sufficiently recognise this reality and fall short in 
supporting feedback from most vulnerable.
Our analysis also revealed low levels of trust in the feed-
back processes at UHCs and the wider health system. 
Patients’ distrust and their resultant hesitation to provide 
feedback, were rooted in their doubts about the benevo-
lence of the health system and in fear of consequences:
Because when we try to say something, we are afraid of not 
getting treated properly or be harassed. There is always a 
fear and we do not say anything. As it happened to me, 
when I complained about something, they asked me to sub-
mit a written complaint. I did not agree because of fear … 
what if I was harassed afterwards? However, if there was a 
system where I could complain, but by hiding my identity, 
it would be better. (Patient: 010)
Fears of retribution and distrust of the system’s ability 
to act fairly, consistently featured as logics underpin-
ning people’s decisions to not provide feedback. While 
some expressed this openly, others were more reticent. 
Many providers recognised this, but proffered rather 
simplistic explanations effectively dismissing these fears 
as unfounded.
They have no reason to fear. It is due to ignorance and lack 
of education. Sometimes, when the patients make verbal 
complaints, we advise them to place written complaints. 
However, they do not agree. (Provider: 003)
Such explanations reflect a disconnect between 
providers and patients. They spotlight entrenched preju-
dices and the class divide whereby the privileged inhabit 
public systems and view the under- privileged as being 
ignorant. Such social relational dynamics are funda-
mental to people’s distrust of the health system, mani-
fested in multiple calls from patients for anonymisation. 
The non- anonymised feedback systems are therefore 
Figure 2 Initial programme theory. CMO, Context- Mechanism- Outcome; UHCs, Upazila Health Complexes.
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under- used. Consequently, people provide feedback 
through their acquaintances.
Most of the time, they express their opinion to those per-
sons who are very familiar to them. Suppose a sweeper or 
cleaner … (Provider: 004)
As the quote illustrates, personal connections were 
preferred feedback routes. While this reflects low levels 
of trust in the system, it could also reflect preferences 
for relational ways of interacting in the society, rather 
than processual bureaucratic ways that current feedback 
channels offer. When queried about a possibility of low 
trust being the reason for the limited uptake of feedback 
channels, providers pointed to the high use of services as 
a counterargument. While this was plausible, it is more 
likely that the high service use merely reflects lack of 
alternative healthcare options.
Our findings are consistent with the literature which 
highlights awareness about rights as a prerequisite to 
exercising one’s agency.38–42 Our findings highlight that 
while being aware is necessary, mere awareness is not 
enough for exercising agency and rights, echoing the 
literature on limited feedback by the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged in Nepal, Russia and Israel11 41 42 and high- 
income contexts such as the UK.43 Fears of retribution 
and distrust of the system consistently underpin people’s 
decisions not to complain.11 41 42 44–46 Patients distrust feed-
back systems because they doubt the benevolence of the 
health system and are afraid of retribution, which under-
mines their agency as the likely principals when providing 
feedback. Conversely, if people were to perceive that they 
will be heard and not penalised for their views, they are 
likely to trust the system and use available channels. This 
supports our initial CMO which posits that awareness of 
rights combined with accessible channels, will trigger a 
sense of translating into exercise of agency.
Preferences of informal feedback have been widely 
reported across public services.7 47–49 This suggests that 
giving feedback involves culturally mediated processes 
governed by local social norms about acceptable conduct. 
This is particularly so where formal processes are weak or 
trust in the system is low, or where there is general prefer-
ence for relational ways of interacting.
Processing feedback
The centrality of clear policies, guidelines, processes and 
roles and fostering overall system’s accountability and 
transparency, emerged as a key finding. One provider 
emphasised that ‘Of course, a guideline is needed. 
Without a guideline, the process cannot be maintained 
in an organised way’. This limited clarity was a critical 
missing link that led to different interpretations of and 
practices around feedback management. It also seemed 
to underpin the apparent lack of shared goals between 
policymakers, local managers and providers:
I think it is also important to know who is designated for 
which work. It is necessary to know who has what author-
ity. There needs to be a guideline. For instance, detailing 
where to begin and whom to go to; what is the process to 
arrive at a resolution (Provider: 010)
These views were echoed by patients, particularly those 
with good knowledge of the healthcare system:
… I would want to know: who is in charge, who will work on 
it, how will they, then who is going to solve it? If it is solved, 
how will they inform the patients? Every step should have 
specific guidelines (Patient: 010)
Clarity about roles and responsibilities could help 
bridge the information asymmetry gap between the 
patients and the healthcare providers, ultimately enabling 
people to exercise their agency in providing feedback. 
Multiple providers consistently viewed this dysfunction as 
a management failure. They pointed to an ad- hoc nature 
of feedback management, and how ‘Complaints have 
never been taken by us positively’; expressing displeasure 
‘If a process existed, then our good officers would not 
suffer like this’ and articulating the desire for fair and 
non- punitive feedback systems ‘If there were guidelines 
… regarding complaints, and if it were clearly written, I 
think that would bring some transparency to the process 
…’.
These quotes highlight the cooperation challenges 
between the Upazila Health and Family Planning Offi-
cers (UHFPOs) and health workers. The UHFPOs do not 
always know the details of strengths and limitations of 
efforts by providers. UHFPOs, perhaps understandably, 
use patient feedback as a lever to extract accountability 
from staff. The absence of transparent documentation 
of feedback means that such tactics by UHFPOs attract 
resentment from staff. In the context of weak feedback 
management processes, the UHFPO’s tactics can under-
mine the learning potential from patient feedback and 
fuel staff resentment towards feedback systems.
A key constraint to feedback processing was the unavail-
ability of dedicated staff with relevant expertise. Obser-
vations revealed that UHCs were generally understaffed 
and feedback management was an additional respon-
sibility for clinical staff. Managers and health workers 
recognised these constraints. Providers argued that ‘An 
extra person be recruited and given the responsibility to 
maintain [feedback system]’, adding that
Because when a doctor is in an emergency and there are 
five patients waiting for him, if anyone calls the [complaints 
phone] number, documenting the feedback from that call 
at that time would be very difficult. That is why dedicated 
human resources are needed (Provider: 003)
Document review revealed that the UHFPO, a medical 
doctor, is responsible for all administrative issues. All UHC 
staff are answerable to the UHFPO who reports upwards 
to the Director General (DG) at MOHFW. However, the 
UHC as a public service is also accountable to the Upazila 
Chairperson, Upazila Nirbahi Officer, Member of Parlia-
ment, religious leaders and local community members—
all members of the UHC Management Committee. This 
committee, however, is chaired by the UHFPO, who is 
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then responsible for communicating all issues upwards 
to higher health authorities.
One provider summarised the UHFPO as: ‘Actu-
ally here everything happens under the command of 
UHFPO. Ok! He can do these activities here. Everything 
is controlled by him’ (Provider: 003). Much power and 
authority lies with the UHFPO to the extent that across 
the two UHCs the management committees were non- 
functional, suggesting that accountability runs primarily 
vertically, and only notionally horizontally.
I am a member of some committee, but the fact is, I do not 
know because the position was given to me in the Upazila 
coordination committee’s meeting … I have been Chair-
man for about eight months. That [attending meetings] 
never happened. (Local leader: 001)
In line with the aforementioned, key actors did not 
deem it worth their while to attend these meetings. The 
following quote highlights usual practices that UHC in 
reality is de- facto answerable to the DG, MOHFW.
We have a management committee; the Parliament Mem-
ber is the president of this committee. Other members are 
the Upazila Executive Officer, Upazila Chairman, Union 
Parishad Chairman, and few community people. All mem-
bers are supposed to attend the monthly meetings. How-
ever, in reality, only we, the doctors of this facility remain 
present … [and] upload the meeting minutes in the MIS 
[management information] system of DG office. (Provid-
er: 001)
Many providers related this disengagement to absence 
of mechanisms for members to exercise their authority 
in the committee. However, this contradicts the fact that 
most members outrank, and have no need to favour, 
the UHFPO. The most plausible explanation is that 
local leaders do not see sufficient political value in these 
committees and health is a generally low political priority 
in Bangladesh.
The literature highlights that clear quality improve-
ment guidelines and supportive policies facilitate well- 
functioning patient feedback systems.45 Similar to our 
results, studies have shown that frontline workers need 
support to manage feedback effectively and that adequate 
supervision can help staff value patient feedback6 44 50 51 
and consequently align somewhat divergent objectives of 
two principals: patients and UHFPOs. However, the mere 
existence of guidelines is not enough, frontline workers 
need to be aware of feedback processes and require skills 
to deal with often difficult interactions.50 Together with 
our findings, this supports our initial CMO that high-
lighted clear policies and guidelines as being important 
in triggering health workers’ feelings of being supported, 
not threatened and valuing patient feedback.
However, we found that a critical contextual aspect of 
our initial CMO was missing. The UHC management 
committees were non- functional with non- involvement 
of local leaders, which undermined their roles as princi-
pals with regards to the UHFPOs. Substantial literature 
has examined the conditions under which local social 
accountability structures can fulfil their mandates.52–55 It 
spotlights that constructive and sustained local political 
involvement is a key to active local accountability struc-
tures, and improvements in service quality, responsive-
ness and equity. This counterfactual analytical rendering 
of what was amiss in our study context thus supports the 
logic of our initial CMO.
Acting on feedback
Robust regulatory framework and institutional support 
were seen by all interviewees as being crucial to enable 
staff to act on feedback. This view was echoed in the 
stakeholder workshops and in national- level documents 
reviewed in the study. Participants agreed that training 
of providers, clear Terms of References or guidelines, 
explicit roles, and resources were critical to effective feed-
back management. While there were plans to introduce 
such frameworks by the MOHFW, none were yet in place.
During interviews, most providers revisited their initial 
resentment towards feedback systems. Many reflected 
that ‘Through the feedback, at least our work would 
get (some) appreciation’, recognised its value in being 
able to ‘praise the good performance and to punish 
misdeeds’, and appreciated the learning opportunities 
from feedback, saying that ‘[in response to feedback] exem-
plary action should be taken so that with one example, 
others become cautious’. Many added that any effective 
regulatory framework should include an appropriate 
balance between incentives and sanctions, arguing for 
links with staff appraisal, rewards and recognition.
Patients accorded high importance to the user- 
friendliness of feedback channels and that actions on 
feedback ought to be transparently communicated to 
enhance the credibility of the feedback.
It is better to inform patients because in this way they will 
get to understand that through this system they solved my 
problem. This patient will spread it to others. (Patient: 
005)
This centrality of open, transparent communication 
between service providers and users to creating trust and 
improving staff–patient relationships was also consist-
ently recognised by providers.
… if we can inform the patients about the solution, they 
will be pleased thinking that their complaints led to some 
solutions. By being happy, they will encourage their neigh-
bours, thinking that problems are being solved and com-
municated well. It will improve the relationship between 
hospital and patients. (Provider: 001)
The literature echoes our findings and adds that while 
policies and guidelines can catalyse action on feed-
back, unsupportive institutional cultures and ineffective 
communication skills of service providers may hinder 
the desired effects.8 43 56 Furthermore, a receptive and 
learning institutional culture can help staff recognise the 
value of transparent and fair feedback management.43 57 
Consistent with our results, scholars have found that trans-
parency in feedback management can enhance the 
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health system’s credibility and foster patient trust,58 thus 
contributing to bridging the information asymmetry and 
alleviating potential losses of agency. This confirms our 
initial CMO which linked clear guidelines and processes 
along with support to facility staff, with a sense of being 
respected and motivation to value and act on feedback.
DISCUSSION
Our revised PT (figure 3) was consolidated following 
testing and refining throughout data collection and anal-
ysis and against the literature.
The testing of CMOs revealed the contingent nature 
of triggering of mechanisms, and variable achievement 
of outcomes. Our revised PT highlights this contingency, 
serving three objectives: first, it helps show the many ways 
in which feedback systems (not) operate to (not) achieve 
their intended outcomes.30 For example, our findings 
highlight the importance of awareness about one’s rights 
for patient feedback, but the actual provision of feedback 
can be constrained by socioeconomic disadvantage and 
fears of retribution. Second, it speaks to a central tenet of 
critical and scientific realism—of causality.59 Further to 
numerous CMO pathways illustrated through arrows in 
figure 3, our results also reveal causality among specific 
contexts (eg, supportive policy and management envi-
ronment contributes to effective exchange between 
patients and staff) and mechanisms (eg, patients’ sense 
of empowerment and staff’s sense of being supported 
contribute to actors’ expectations of improvements) and 
arguably contribute to advancing theorisation around 
causality within complex programmes. Third, the ‘if- 
then’ propositions reflected in the narrative of figure 3 
and multiple causal pathways, can serve as a practical 
heuristic for informing future interventions and poli-
cies, as argued elsewhere.60 61 The contingent nature of 
contexts, interventions, mechanisms and outcomes also 
further highlights the inter- related three steps of the 
feedback process.
Figure 3 Refined programme theory of patient feedback systems in Bangladesh.
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Awareness of feedback channels and people’s trust in 
health systems are important determinants of people’s 
citizenship identity and willingness to exercise their 
agency. Awareness and trust are, however, insufficient 
and need to be bolstered by recognition of rights to 
provide feedback, accessibility of feedback channels, 
clear policies and guidelines, and appropriate incentives 
and sanctions to ensure staff compliance.1 5 15 In line with 
published evidence,1 5 8 62 a key determinant of decisions 
to provide feedback is people’s confidence not to be 
disadvantaged after providing feedback. Societal prefer-
ences for relational ways of interacting and social norms 
about appropriate ways of expressing dissatisfaction also 
shape the use of feedback channels.58
The primacy of vertical accountability in UHCs raises 
many questions. The UHFPO’s leadership has its advan-
tages. The UHFPOs are the principals vis-à-vis the 
health workers but are the agents vis-à-vis the DG and 
the patients. Effective performance of being a principal 
and an agent role by UHFPOs is likely to be difficult and 
untenable. The UHFPOs’ current role reinforces hierar-
chies and concentrates power. This may demotivate staff 
from learning from feedback within health facilities1 43 62 
and may prevent some patients from providing feedback 
and instead exerting violence.63 64 Weak horizontal 
accountability, evidenced by non- functional manage-
ment committees and lack of engagement from local 
leaders, may reflect political realities, and that people 
have to turn to own social networks to redress grievances, 
is problematic. From an equity perspective, reliance 
on social networks to express grievances systematically 
disadvantages the exercise of citizenship by those with 
the least social and relational capital. Weak horizontal 
accountability is a missed opportunity, given that liter-
ature attests to potential quality, equity and responsive-
ness gains through local accountability processes.52–55 
While in the immediate future, improvements to patient 
feedback systems could leverage the currently dominant 
vertical accountability, it would be critical to recognise its 
limitations in providing equal opportunities and spaces 
for those most disadvantaged.18 19 This literature notwith-
standing, our findings caution against a universalist 
normative understanding that healthcare can be held to 
account through local political structures in all contexts. 
Our findings highlight that where health is not a polit-
ical priority and where local leaders are not answerable 
to people, horizontal arrangements like the manage-
ment committees at UHCs, are unlikely to be equitably 
effective.
We explored the application of PA theory in health-
care settings. Our findings suggest that the two funda-
mental tenets of PA theory (information asymmetry and 
divergent goals) are less clear- cut within patient feedback 
systems. Managers, providers and patients can be both 
principals and agents. Such blurred identity and rela-
tional boundaries highlight the multiple, dynamic and 
often conflicting, roles and responsibilities within prin-
cipal–agent relationships27 at the frontline of healthcare 
provision. Our results also extend the understanding 
of PA theory in two inter- related ways. Patient feedback 
systems can loosen information asymmetry between the 
agents and principals, for example, through patients 
communicating information about the health workers’ 
conduct to the managers. Consequently, feedback systems 
can therefore contribute to alleviating agency losses, for 
example, through health workers empowering patients 
by sharing actions taken in response to their feedback.
Combining the citizenship and PA theories has allowed 
us to gain insights into the logics underpinning three 
steps of patient feedback processes.15 People’s use of 
available feedback channels entails people expressing 
their citizenship and agency, within the context of inter-
pretations of one’s identities and power relations and 
information asymmetries between patients and health-
care providers.16 18 19 26 Adequate processing and anal-
ysis of patient feedback is contingent on health workers’ 
willingness to engage with feedback within the context 
of in- situ organisational dynamics, target- setting and staff 
performance management.6 44 50 51 Actions on patient 
feedback, including reporting back to patients, entail 
bridging of information asymmetries across various prin-
cipal–agent relationships, and enabling the expression 
of citizenship and exercise of agency of patients, health 
workers and facility managers alike.20 26 57
We propose three implications for future health policy 
and practice. First, health systems should ensure and 
maintain people’s awareness of their rights to provide 
feedback, and of available and easily accessible feed-
back channels, within a non- threatening environment 
in which patients can express their views without fears 
of subsequent retribution. Second, clear policies and 
operating guidelines with adequate support and dedi-
cated resources, will enable health facility workers to 
value, document and analyse information from patient 
feedback. Last but not least, communicating timely 
actions taken in response to the feedback will help main-
tain people’s satisfaction with, and trust in, their health 
systems and will help maintain the rapport between the 
people, health workers and managers.
Study limitations
We recognise two study limitations. First, our inquiry was 
framed within two substantive theories, and while we feel 
using citizenship and PA theories has allowed us to under-
stand the logics of patient feedback systems and advance 
the understanding of these theories, future studies can 
anchor their inquiries in other theories such as on rela-
tional trust or motivation. While we consider our refined 
PT being comprehensive given our robust study design, 
grounding inquiry in other substantive theories may 
enhance or even add further dimensions to the CMO 
configurations. Second, we examined established patient 
feedback systems at selected grassroots- level health facil-
ities and in one district and country only, and future 
research can test our refined theory in hospital settings, 
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further countries and possibly feedback systems which 
involve substantial informal processes and engagements.
CONCLUSIONS
Appropriate policy frameworks and clear implementation 
processes and explicit consideration of historical, social and 
institutional relational arrangements, are key to the design 
and effective implementation of complex programmes 
such as patient feedback systems. Further, in contexts 
where there is a preference for relational ways of interac-
tion, people will exercise their citizenship and agency to 
provide feedback only if they can trust the health system.
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